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Abstract: Embedded encryption devices and smart sensors are vulnerable to physical attacks. Due to
the continuous shrinking of chip size, laser injection, particle radiation and electromagnetic transient
injection are possible methods that introduce transient multiple faults. In the fault analysis stage,
the adversary is unclear about the actual number of faults injected. Typically, the single-nibble fault
analysis encounters difficulties. Therefore, in this paper, we propose novel ciphertext-only impossible
differentials that can analyze the number of random faults to six nibbles. We use the impossible
differentials to exclude the secret key that definitely does not exist, and then gradually obtain the
unique secret key through inverse difference equations. Using software simulation, we conducted
32,000 random multiple fault attacks on Midori. The experiments were carried out to verify the
theoretical model of multiple fault attacks. We obtain the relationship between fault injection and
information content. To reduce the number of fault attacks, we further optimized the fault attack
method. The secret key can be obtained at least 11 times. The proposed ciphertext-only impossible
differential analysis provides an effective method for random multiple faults analysis, which would
be helpful for improving the security of block ciphers.
Keywords: transient electromagnetic injection; ciphertext-only fault analysis; Midori; random
multiple fault attacks; differential attack
1. Introduction
With the rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) applications, people’s productivity and daily
lives have changed. People are enjoying the convenience of intelligent sensor network services;
simultaneously, information security is essential. The potential attacks in IoT networks are increasing.
The most exposed and vulnerable devices in IoT are routers, cameras, network attached storage (NAS)
and printers, as shown in Figure 1. The private data collected by the intelligent sensor networks are
carried by the underlying chips and transmitted to networks for data exchanges and data analysis.
However, the attacker can obtain the secret key from the chip by performing physical attacks on the
target chip. After the fault attacks are injected into the chip, the attackers can steal users’ private data;
maliciously attack the network terminal nodes; and monitor and tamper with the sensitive data in
the network. Therefore, physical attacks cause considerable harm to smart sensors and embedded
encryption devices in the IoT.
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Figure 1. Attack scenario in the Internet of Things (IoT).
Physical attacks have attracted widespread attention in lightweight block ciphers. One method to
analyze lightweight block ciphers is directly through electromagnetic radiation using methods such
as simple electromagnetic analysis (SEMA) [1], correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) [2] and
differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA) [3]. Other methods involve using clock disturbance,
electromagnetic fault injection and laser fault injection [4–6] on the specified data registers by analyzing
the fault ciphertext to obtain the secret key. Laser fault injection can inject bit-level faults in the specified
data register, but the instrument for fault injection is more expensive. However, the manufacturing
cost of the electromagnetic fault injection probe is lower. Dehbaoui et al. [7] and S. Ordas et al. [8]
designed electromagnetic probes and used electromagnetic attacks to implement bit set or bit reset of
data in the chip. Accurately injecting the fault into the encryption device is a prerequisite for obtaining
the secret key. After the fault is injected, a proper fault analysis method is required to further obtain the
secret key. Since Boneh et al. [9] used fault attacks to break RSA, effective fault analysis methods have
become research hotspot. In lightweight block encryption analysis, fault attacks have been extended to
impossible differential fault attack (IDFA) [10], impossible differential attack (IDA) [11,12], algebraic
fault attack (AFA) [13], impossible meet-in-the-middle attack (IMMA) [14], differential fault attack
(DFA) [15] and blind fault attack [16]. These methods mainly analyze the characteristic relationship
between the data of the cryptosystem after the injection fault and obtain the secret key by means of
solver and mathematical analysis.
The secret key can be quickly obtained by an appropriate fault analysis model. The proposed fault
attack models mainly include the random single-byte [17], random single-nibble model [15], one-bit
model [18] and diagonal model [19]. In addition to the fault analysis models proposed above, several
novel fault attack models, such as persistent fault attack (PFA) [20] and rebound attack (RA) [21],
were proposed. The proposed fault analysis models include a few random multiple fault attack
models. However, transient multiple fault attacks occur during an electromagnetic transient fault
injection [22,23]. Therefore, studying the random multiple fault attack model has important practical
significance for fault analysis.
Single bit fault [24] and single nibble fault analysis models are widely used in high precision
laser fault attacks. However, the attackers can use less sophisticated electromagnetic fault injection to
attack sensors in IoT. An electromagnetic fault attack firstly introduces a transient fault [7,8] to the
working chip by an electromagnetic probe. The correct key is obtained by collecting and analyzing
the relationship between the fault and the correct data. During actual fault injection, the number and
location of faults in the data register are affected by the precision of the injection equipment and the
electromagnetic interference during the injection. At this time, the output electromagnetic wave injects
multiple faults to the target data register. Therefore, the number and locations of random faults in the
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data register cannot be predicted by the attacker. If a single nibble or single byte model is still used for
analysis, the fault attack analysis fails.
Thus, IoT device security can be achieved with a lightweight cryptosystem. Midori is an
energy-efficient lightweight cryptosystem proposed by Banik et al. [25]. Midori has broad application
prospects in wireless sensor networks. To assess the security of Midori, many researchers developed
various attack techniques on Midori. Cheng et al. [15] presented a cell-oriented fault propagation
patterns on Midori. Chen et al. [11] designed 10 rounds of impossible differential paths to attack
Midori-128. Shahmirzdi et al. [12] conducted three impossible differential attacks on Midori-64 with
10, 11 and 12 rounds. Nozaki et al. [26] distinguished the correct key from the error key by Hamming
distance. Todo et al. [27] found a nonlinear invariant Boolean function G to distinguish the secret key.
The differential fault attack (DFA) [15,17–19] is a widely applied cryptanalysis technique.
The correct and the faulty value are different at the fault point, and the attacker can obtain the
secret key by analyzing differential faults. Impossible differential analysis is a powerful analysis
method proposed by Knudsen [28] and Biham et al. [29]. By analyzing fault propagation paths, the
elements that are absolutely impossible to exist in the key space are eliminated. As such, the correct
key is obtained step by step. Differential fault attacks combine well with other attack methods, and the
attack effect is significant. Many scholars applied this method to their issues. Combing differential
fault analysis with algebraic attack, Jovanovic et al. [30] and Zhao et al. [13] successfully attacked
LED-64 with a single fault injection. Li et al. [10] presented a novel impossible differential fault analysis
on LED-64. To the best of our knowledge, a random multiple fault attack model on lightweight Midori
against the impossible differential fault attack (IDFA) has not been proposed. We further optimized the
proposed scheme of fault attacks during the experiment.
The major contributions of the paper are as follows:
(1) We propose an analysis model on lightweight Midori that can be used to analyze most of
the random multiple fault attacks. We increase the number of analysis faults from one to six.
The random multiple fault attack model can effectively analyze complex fault attacks.
(2) Through experimental simulation analysis, a linear function relationship between the number of
fault attacks and the remaining key information content is obtained.
(3) The ciphertext-only fault attack is the attack method with the least known information. In this
paper, the secret key is obtained by combining the impossible attack and the differential fault
attack. Using the secret key invariant subspace, the secret key can be obtained by intersection of
the subspace.
We summarize the results of the best-known attack on Midori-64 in Table 1. Li et al. [31] used
six distinguishers to analyze the security of Midori-64. Among them, the hamming weight (HW)
distinguisher provides the most effective fault analysis. However, the method can only analyze a
random-nibble fault in the 15th round, and the number of fault injections is high. Cheng et al. [15]
injected a random-nibble fault into the data register. By analyzing the differential fault propagation path
of Midori, they found four invariant fault differential patterns. By analyzing these patterns to estimate
the location where the fault was injected, they obtained the secret key. However, Cheng et al. [15]
were only able to recover 80% of the secret key, and they did not discuss multiple fault injections. Our
proposed method can be used not only analyze multiple random faults but also requires fewer fault
injections. At least 11 fault injections are required to obtain the secret key. At present, the problem
of multiple faults in data registers has been ignored by researchers. Analyzing the propagation of
multiple fault differentials and using the combination of impossible fault attacks and differential fault
attacks to improve the security of the lightweight cryptosystem in the case of multiple faults were the
motivations of this study.
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Table 1. Comparison of this work with previous fault attacks on Midori-64.
Reference Fault Model Numberof Faults
Method Probability Round Value Distinguishmultiple- nibble fault
[31] HW 100% R = 15 1 Nibble No 280
[15] DFA 80% R = 14 1 Nibble No 2
this paper IDFA 100% R = 14 1–6 Nibble(s) Yes 11
The rest of this article is divided into the following sections. In Section 2, we briefly describe
Midori. In Section 3, we propose a random multiple fault attack model. In Section 4, we provide a
detailed calculation for the model. In Section 5, we describe the experimental results. In the last section,
we conclude this paper.
2. Specifications of Midori and Symbol Description
2.1. Midori
Midori is an energy-optimized, lightweight cryptosystem that can be used in resource-constrained
circuits. Midori-64 and Midori-128 are two cryptosystems with 16 and 20 rounds, respectively.
The round function of Midori is KeyAdd, SubCell (SB), ShuffleCell (SC), MixColumn (MC) and Round
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and  ܥ∗   be  the  faulty  ciphertext.  Let  ܺ௅ ∈ ሺሼ0,1ሽସሻଵ଺ ,  ܻ௅ ∈ ሺሼ0,1ሽସሻଵ଺ ,  ܼ௅ ∈ ሺሼ0,1ሽସሻଵ଺   andܹ௅ ∈
ሺሼ0,1ሽସሻଵ଺  denote  the output value of  the Round Constants, SubCell, ShuffleCell and MixColumn 
layers  in  the  ܮ‐th  round with  1 ൑ ܮ ൑16,  respectively. Let  ∆ܺ௅ ,  ∆ܻ௅ ,  ∆ܼ௅   and  ∆ܹ௅   denote  the 
output difference of X, Y, Z and W in the  ܮ‐th round, respectively. Equation (1) denotes each nibble 
in  ∆ܺ௅,  ∆ܻ௅,  ∆ܼ௅  and	∆ܹ௅, respectively. 
Figure 2. Overal structure of Midori-64.
(1) The KeyAdd operation uses the XOR operator with the key. The key of the first round a the
last round is the key whitening op ration. From the 2nd to the 15th round, K0 and K1 alternately
XORed with the roun function in the cryptosystem.
(2) SubCell transform is the only no -linear operation. SubCell operation minimizes the bit flip
betw en input and outp t. Forwa d nd i verse S-boxes are th same athematical form.
(3) ShuffleCell r ar anges the cell positi n in a fixed or er.










(5) Round Constants operation is XORed by the form of 4 × 4 binary matrices.
2.2. Symbol Description
The following notation is used to describe the analysis of Midori. Let C be the right ciphertext and
C∗ be the faulty iphertext. Let XL ∈ ({0, 1}4)16, YL ∈ ({0, 1}4)16, ZL ∈ ({0, 1}4)16 and WL ∈ ({0, 1}4)16
denote the output v lue of the Round Constants, SubCell, ShuffleCell and MixColumn layers in the
L-th round with 1 ≤ L ≤ 16, respectively. Let ∆XL, ∆YL, ∆ZL and ∆WL denote the output difference of
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denote the i-th row and the j-th column. ⊕ denotes bitwise exclusive-or operation. We
denote the inverse operations of Round Constants, SubCell, ShuffleCell, MixColumn by INVRC, INVSB,
INVSHC and INVMC, respectively. Let∅{i, j} and∅{ j} denote the set ofY16{i, j} andY
16
{ j}when the estimated
∆Z15{i, j} = 0 and ∆Z
15
{ j} = 0, respectively. Let θ denote the intersection of ρ.
3. Random Multi-Fault Attack Model
Space particle radiation, aging of electronics and electromagnetic interference can disturb the
current inside a chip. Faults are classified into intentional injection faults and unintentional injection
faults. Faults can also be classified as transient faults, permanent faults and persistent faults. Compared
with persistent fault injection [20], transient fault injection causes less damage to the chip. Therefore,
most of the fault attacks are transient fault attacks. Although the position of the internal bit flip is
related to the accuracy of the fault injection tool, the faults mentioned above have more random faults
in the actual fault injection and attackers do not know. The electromagnetic waves radiated by the
probe can disturb the clock circuit and the surrounding registers. Data transmission and data exchange
in the chip are clock synchronized. In data transmission, setup-time and hold-time must be stable.
In the process of electromagnetic fault injection, clock stability rapidly decreases, so setup-time and
hold-time deviate, as shown in Figure 3. The occurrence of random multiple faults is complicated and
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Let  ሼ݅, ݆ሽ  denote the  ݅‐th row and the  ݆‐th column.	⊕  denotes bitwise exclusive‐or operation. 
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ሼܻ௝ሽଵ଺ when the estimated  Δܼሼ௜,௝ሽଵହ ൌ 0  and  ∆ܼሼ௝ሽଵହ  = 0, respectively. Let  ߠ  denote the intersection of  ߩ. 
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paper, a general random multiple fault model is proposed. The random multiple fault analysis model 








the  faulty  ciphertexts  after  each  fault  injection.  The  attacker does  not  need  to  know  the  correct 
Figure 3. Clock disturbance of D flip-flop.
A suitable attack model is important for security analysis. If a fault attack model cannot effectively
analyze actual faults, the analysis of a cryptosystem will encounter many difficulties. At present,
models for multiple fault attacks are lacking. Liao et al. [32] proposed a multiple fault attack model
with no more than three bytes. Using matrix diagonals, Saha et al. [19] analyzed multiple byte faults,
but with relatively few types of faults. To the best of our knowledge, no random multiple fault attack
model against Midori has yet been proposed. From the perspective of engineering, in this paper, a
general random multiple fault model is proposed. The random multiple fault analysis model can be
applied to most of the random fault attacks and improve the security of lightweight cryptosystems in
IoT networks.
3.1. Fault Attacks Hypothesis
This paper does not deal with the physical implementation of the attack. Fault attacks against
Midori can be implemented based the following assumptions: An attacker is able to inject faults in the
14th round data register of Midori-64 and the number of the faults is no more than six. There is no
fault injection in other memory elements of the crypto-hardware. After fault injection, the value of
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fault registers changes and the fault location is unknown. The attacker can obtain the correct and the
faulty ciphertexts after each fault injection. The attacker does not need to know the correct plaintext,
so this is a ciphertext-only attack. An attacker injects multiple random faults in the 14th round of
cryptosystem. As can be seen from Figure 2, the fault injection is the same in SubCell, ShuffleCell, and
Round Constants. Assuming an electromagnetic fault is injected, there are four to six nibble faults.
Random faults in data registers are shown in Figures 4–6. The black circle indicates the fault point.
Figures 4–6 describe the distributions of four to six faults. The faults in Figures 4–6 indicate that the
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i re  Figure 6. Six random faults.
3.2. Analysis of Random Multiple Fault Attack Models
Figure 7 shows how faults propagate when random multiple faults are injected into the 14th
round. The fault state in the dashed box can be replaced by any state in Figures 4–6. According to
the fault injection assumption mentioned above, the number of random faults in each column of the
∆X15, ∆Y15 and ∆Z15 is 0 to 4. To successfully implement random multiple fault attacks, we explain
the two problems.
1. Problem 1: The location of no faults in each column of∆X15, ∆Y15 and ∆Z15 is unknown. There are
four positions in a column. We estimate all four fault positions as fault-free, and then take the
union of the estimated invariant space in the column.
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2. Problem 2: As the location and number of each fault injection are unknown, there may be 0–4
faults in a certain column of ∆Z15. After injecting random multiple faults two or three times into
the cryptosystem, an adversary takes a fault-free union at each position of ∆Z15. It is possible
that the number of faults in a column is four. If the adversary predicts this column as fault-free,
an error will occur. To avoid mistakes, the adversary can inject faults two or three times into the
cryptosystem. In other words, the adversary avoids mistakes by taking the unions multiple times.



















∆ܻଵ଺ 	ൌ 	∆ܥଵ଺  (2)
By observing the Figure 7, we obtain the following differential equations: 
∆ܹଵହ 	ൌ 	∆ܺଵ଺ 	ൌ 	INVSBሺ∆ܻଵ଺ሻ  (3)
∆ܼଵହ 	ൌ 	INVMIXሺ∆ܹଵହሻ	 (4)
We can further obtain Equations (5) – (8) by expanding Equation (4). 
∆ܼሼଵ,ଵା௟ሽଵହ 	ൌ 	INVSBሺ∆ܥሼଶ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ሻ ⊕ INVSBሺ∆ܥሼଷ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ሻ ⊕ INVSBሺ∆ܥሼସ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ሻ  (5)
∆ܼሼଶ,ଵା௟ሽଵହ 	ൌ 	INVSB൫∆ܥሼଵ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ൯ ⊕ INVSBሺ∆ܥሼଷ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ⊕ INVSBሺ∆ܥሼସ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ሻ (6)
∆ܼሼଷ,ଵା௟ሽଵହ 	ൌ 	INVSB൫∆ܥሼଵ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ൯ ⊕ INVSBሺ∆ܥሼଶ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ⊕ INVSBሺ∆ܥሼସ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ሻ (7)
∆ܼሼସ,ଵା௟ሽଵହ 	ൌ 	INVSBሺ∆ܥሼଵ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ሻ ⊕ INVSBሺ∆ܥሼଶ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ሻ ⊕ INVSBሺ∆ܥሼଷ,ଵା௟ሽଵ଺ ሻ (8)
∅ሼ௝ሽ 	ൌ 	∅ሼଵ,௝ሽ ∪ ∅ሼଶ,௝ሽ ∪ ∅ሼଷ,௝ሽ ∪ ∅ሼସ,௝ሽ (9)
where j = 1,2,3,4  and	l	=	0,1,2,3. 
The relationship between  ∆ܼଵହ  and  ∆ܻଵହ  is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. The inverse differential of Midori. 




are always  the same;  that  is, we can uniquely determine  ܻଵ଺  and  ܻଵହ  by  the estimation of S‐box 
outputs. 
Figure 7. Random multiple faults’ prop gation paths.
4. Analysis of Fault Difference Equations
The analysis of the multiple differential fault path is shown in Figure 7. We perform the inverse
operation through the inverse output differential of the 16th round S-box.
∆Y16 = ∆C16 (2)
By observing the Figure 7, we obtain the following differential equations:






























⊕ INVSB(∆C16{2,1+l}) ⊕ INVSB(∆C16{3,1+l}) (8)
∅{ j} = ∅{1, j} ∪ ∅{2, j} ∪ ∅{3, j} ∪ ∅{4, j} (9)
where j = 1, 2, 3,4 and l = 0, 1, 2, 3.
The relationship between ∆Z15 and ∆Y15 is show n Table 2.
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For the differential characteristics of the inverse S-box, as shown in Table 3, one input difference
corresponds to multiple output differences. However, in a fault attack, the plaintext and secret key are
always the same; that is, we can uniquely determine Y16 and Y15 by the estimation of S-box outputs.
Table 3. Difference distribution of Midori inverse S-box.
γ β
1 1 2 4 5 6 8 14
2 1 4 9 12
3 4 6 7 8 9 13 15
4 1 2 3 4 5 8 11
5 1 4 7 9 10 12
6 1 3 7 8 12 13 15
7 3 5 6 11 13 14
8 1 3 4 6 9 11 12 14
9 2 3 5 8 9 11 12
10 5 10 13 15
11 4 7 8 9 11 13 15
12 5 6 8 9 12 14
13 3 6 7 10 11 14
14 1 7 8 12 13 14 15
15 3 6 10 11 14 15
0 0
γ and β represent inverse input and output difference, respectively.
The adversary estimates ∆W15 are listed in Table 2. Predicting the locations of multiple faults
is impossible due to the complexity of random multiple fault injection. When the differential faults
propagate to ∆Z15, the adversary estimates the fault-free position of ∆Z15, using Equations (5)–(9).
Invariant space Y16 is reduced by excluding non-zero nibbles in each column of ∆Z15. According to
the explanations of Problems 1 and 2 above, when the adversary injects faults two or three times, the
fault-free difference must exist in some columns of ∆Z15. After a fault attack, each column of candidate
Y16 can be expressed by the Equations (10)–(12). According to Problems 1 and 2 discussed above, the
attackers independently induce faults two or three times at the 14th round and take the union of ∅, as
shown in Equation (10).
ρm = ∅3m−2 ∪ ∅3m−1 ∪ ∅3m(m = 1, 2, 3) (10)
where 3m− 2, 3m− 1 and 3m represent the number of fault attacks and m represents the number of ∅
unions. The attacker can obtain the set of estimated Y16, as shown in Equations (11) and (12).
θp = ρ2p−1 ∩ ρ2p (p = 1, 2, · · ·) (11)
ωq = θ2q−1 ∩ θ2q (q = 1, 2, · · ·) (12)
where p and q are the number of intersections. The attacker injects faults repeatedly until the element
in ωq is unique. During fault attacks, the elements of the set θ may be an empty set for various reasons.
When θ is empty, the attacker cancels ρ and re-injects random faults. Therefore, the adversary will
eventually obtain a unique Y16 by constantly injecting faults.
SB(Y16) ⊕K0 ⊕K1 = C (13)
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Then, WK can be obtained according to the following formula:
WK = K0 ⊕K1 = C⊕ INVSB(Y16). (14)
According to the key schedule of Midori, the adversary makes further derivations to obtain K0.
The equations are shown in Equations (15) to (19).
∆Y15 = INVSHC(INVMIX(∆X16)) (15)
∆X16 = INVSB(C⊕WK) ⊕ INVSB(C∗ ⊕WK) (16)
With the method proposed above, we do not need to inject the fault again; the unique Y15 can be
recovered by the same fault attack data.





⊕WK = C (18)
K0 can be obtained using Equation (19).
K0 = W15 ⊕ INVRC(INVSB(C⊕WK)) (19)
5. Experimental Analysis and Results
The random multiple fault attacks experiments were performed on a PC with a CoreTM i3 CPU
with 4GB of RAM, using MATLAB language.
Information entropy is a method used to measure the estimation of source data. Sakiyama et al. [33]
theoretically analyzed information entropy of the key leakage on S-box. However, in the multi-fault
analysis for lightweight Midori, reports are absent on the secret key leakage relationship between
the number of fault attacks and leak information content. To determine the relationship between the
number of fault attacks and information content, we simulated 32,000 random multiple faults. Figure 8
shows a total of 32,000 curves, each colored line representing a fault attack process of the recovery
secret key. Midori-64 initially needed to determine the 64-bit secret key without fault injection. With
our proposed algorithm, when the intersection of the secret key space was taken about 10 times, the
amount of undefined information content was reduced to five. We continued to intersect the secret






ܹଵହ 	ൌ 	MCሺSHCሺSBሺܻଵହሻሻሻ  (17)
SB൫RCሺܹଵହ ⊕ܭ଴ሻ൯⊕ܹܭ ൌ 	ܥ  (18)
ܭ଴  can be obtained using Equation (19). 
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Figure 8. The remaining information content in 32000 fault attacks. Figure 8. The remaining information content in 32, f lt tt s.
To identify the relationship between predicted fault injection and the amount of information to be
predicted, we took the mode (black dot) simulation fitting during 32,000 fault attacks and obtained
Sensors 2020, 20, 1976 10 of 13
the functional relationship as shown below. Compared with Figure 8, the fitted graph in Figure 9
perfectly depicts the entire fault analysis process. The red curve in Figure 9 shows the boundary values
of the data during the prediction process. The relationship between the number of intersections and
remaining information content secret key bits is shown in Figure 9. We obtained the following formula
by computer fitting:
y =
 a · e−( n−bc )
2
0 ≤ n ≤ 26
[0, 3] n ≥ 27 , (20)
where y is the remaining information content; n is the number of intersections; and a, b and c are
constants. The ranges of a, b and c are: a = 105.4 (78.25, 132.6), b = −10.85 (−14.56,−7.142) and





ݕ	 ൌ 	 ቊܽ ∙ ݁ିሺ
೙ష್
೎ ሻమ 0 ൑ ݊ ൑ 26
ሾ0,3ሿ ݊ ൒ 27 ,  (20)
where  ݕ  is  the  remaining  information content;  ݊  is  the number of  intersections; and  ܽ,  ܾ  and	ܿ 
are  constants.  The  ranges  of  ܽ ,  ܾ	 and  ܿ   are:  ܽ	 ൌ 	105.4	ሺ78.25, 132.6ሻ, ܾ	 ൌ
	െ10.85	ሺെ14.56, െ7.142ሻ  and  ܿ	 ൌ 	14.9	ሺ13.18,16.63ሻ. 
Therefore, 
ݕ	 ൌ 	 ቊ105.4 ∙ ݁ିሺ
೙శభబ.ఱఴ
భర.వ ሻమ 0 ൑ ݊ ൑ 26
ሾ0,3ሿ ݊ ൒ 27   (21)
Equation (20) shows good agreement with the experimental results. The adversary can obtain 
the  remaining  information  content by  taking  the number of  intersections  into Equation  (20). The 
remaining  information  content  shrinks  with  the  intersection,  as  shown  in  Figure  9.  When  the 
remaining  information  content  is  1  bit, more  faults need  to  be  injected  to make  the  information 
content 0 bit. To further explain the existence of a large number of 1‐bits, we counted the remaining 






implemented within  20  times. Figure  12  shows  the  time distribution of  fault  attack. Most of  the 
security  keys  can  be  recovered within  80  s.  The  efficiency  after  optimization  greatly  improved 
compared to before optimization. 
  
Figure 9. The relationship between the remaining information content and the number of intersections.
Therefore,
y =
 105.4 · e−( n+10.5814.9 )
2
0 ≤ n ≤ 26
[0, 3] n ≥ 27 (21)
Equation (20) shows good agreement with the experimental results. The adversary can obtain the
remaining information content by taking the number of intersections into Equation (20). The remaining
information content shrinks with the intersection, as shown in Figure 9. When the remaining
information content is 1 bit, more faults need to be injected to make the information content 0 bit.
To further explain the existence of a large number of 1-bits, we counted the remaining information
content of each column during the attacks. As shown in Figure 10, the number of intersections is
around 20.
Sensors 2020, 20, x 11 of 14 
 
 
Figure 10. The number of attacks of each column. 
 
Figure 11. The relationship between the remaining information content and the number of 
intersections. 
 
Figure 12. The distribution of the attack time. 
6. Conclusions 
In IoT networks, the data security of each sensor node faces severe challenges. The scattered 
distribution of a large number of nodes is convenient for attackers. In this paper, a novel random 
multiple fault attack method on Midori is proposed. The fault attack method can successfully recover 
the secret key in Midori with at least 11 attacks. Using computer simulation, we obtain the leakage 
relationship between the number of fault attacks and information content, which provides a 
theoretical basis for quickly obtaining the secret key. An adversary can use this function to judge the 
range of the remaining secret key. The random multiple fault attack method, provided in this paper 
Figure 10. The number of attacks of each column.
Sensors 2020, 20, 1976 11 of 13
To reduce the number of fault injections and improve attack efficiency, the attacker stops fault
injection when there is 1 bit left. We took the undetermined secret key into Midori-64 for verification.
As shown in Figure 11, we counted the number of fault attacks before and after optimization.
After optimization, the number of fault attacks reduced considerably, and most of attacks could be
implemented within 20 times. Figure 12 shows the time distribution of fault attack. Most of the security
keys can be recovered within 80 s. The efficiency after optimization greatly improved compared to
before optimization.
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6. Conclusions
In IoT networks, the data security of each sensor node faces severe challenges. The scattered
distribution of a large number of nodes is convenient for attackers. In this paper, a novel random
multiple fault attack method on Midori is proposed. The fault attack method can successfully recover
the secret key in Midori with least 11 attacks. U i g computer simulation, we obtain t leakage
relationship between th ber of fault attacks and information content, which provides a theo etical
basis for quick y obtaining the secret key. An adversary can use this function to judge the range of the
remaining secret key. The random multiple fault attack method, provided in this paper is applic ble
to m ny fields. We present the random multiple fault analysis method, which provides a the retical
model for the nalysis of unknown location and he number of fault injections. The proposed attack
model can be applied to most of the las r fault attacks and electromagnetic fault attacks. We further
optimized the attack scheme, reduced the number of fault attacks and decreased the time of fault
attacks. The method proposed in this paper is helpful for analyzing the gradual process for obtaining
secret keys under multiple faults. We expect that the multiple fault attacks will improve the security of
lightweight cryptosystems.
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